Publications
Edited book
Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays (co-edited w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Oxford University Press, 2019.
Oxford University Press, 2019.
Journal articles
Belief Gambles in Epistemic Decision Theory
Philosophical Studies, forthcoming
Bayesianism for non-ideal agents (w/ Jens Christian Bjerring)
Erkenntnis, forthcoming
An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Mind, forthcoming
Hyperintensional Semantics: A Fregean Approach (w/ Jens Christian Bjerring)
Synthese, forthcoming
Explaining the Illusion of Asymmetric Insight (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10, 2019, pp. 769-86.
Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat
Erkenntnis, 84(6), 2019, pp. 1369-86.
Group Disagreement: A Belief Aggregation Perspective (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Synthese, 196, 2019, pp. 4033-58.
A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience (w/ Jens Christian Bjerring)
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48, 2019, pp. 501-22.
Higher-Order Defeat Without Epistemic Dilemmas
Logos & Episteme, 9(4), 2018, pp. 451-65.
A Higher-Order Approach to Disagreement (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Jens Christian Bjerring)
Episteme, 15(1), 2018, pp. 80-100.
Counterpossibles and the Nature of Impossible Worlds
SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy, 17(2), 2016, pp. 145-58.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience
Logic and Logical Philosophy, 24(3), 2015, pp. 377-99.
Philosophical Studies, forthcoming
Bayesianism for non-ideal agents (w/ Jens Christian Bjerring)
Erkenntnis, forthcoming
An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Mind, forthcoming
Hyperintensional Semantics: A Fregean Approach (w/ Jens Christian Bjerring)
Synthese, forthcoming
Explaining the Illusion of Asymmetric Insight (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10, 2019, pp. 769-86.
Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat
Erkenntnis, 84(6), 2019, pp. 1369-86.
Group Disagreement: A Belief Aggregation Perspective (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Synthese, 196, 2019, pp. 4033-58.
A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience (w/ Jens Christian Bjerring)
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48, 2019, pp. 501-22.
Higher-Order Defeat Without Epistemic Dilemmas
Logos & Episteme, 9(4), 2018, pp. 451-65.
A Higher-Order Approach to Disagreement (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Jens Christian Bjerring)
Episteme, 15(1), 2018, pp. 80-100.
Counterpossibles and the Nature of Impossible Worlds
SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy, 17(2), 2016, pp. 145-58.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience
Logic and Logical Philosophy, 24(3), 2015, pp. 377-99.
Book chapters
When Conciliation Frustrates the Epistemic Priorities of Groups (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Forthcoming in The Epistemology of Group Disagreement, F. Broncano-Berrocal and J. Adam Carter (eds.), forthcoming with Routledge.
Instrumental Reasons for Belief: Elliptical Talk and Elusive Properties (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity, G. Ernst and S. Schmidt (eds.), forthcoming with Routledge.
Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence*
Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, 2019, M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Forthcoming in The Epistemology of Group Disagreement, F. Broncano-Berrocal and J. Adam Carter (eds.), forthcoming with Routledge.
Instrumental Reasons for Belief: Elliptical Talk and Elusive Properties (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity, G. Ernst and S. Schmidt (eds.), forthcoming with Routledge.
Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence*
Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, 2019, M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Work in progress
Paper on higher-order uncertainty
I argue that rationality demands higher-order certainty: that is, you should always be certain about what you should believe.
Paper on higher-order evidence and the normativity of logic
I argue that ideal rationality doesn't require logical omniscience, for reasons having to do with the normative significance of
higher-order evidence.
The Humility Heuristic or: People Worth Trusting Admit to What They Don't Know
I offer a vindication of the idea that people who express epistemic humility are more trustworthy for that reason.
*There are a number of typesetting errors in the published version of "Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence." They are corrected in the version linked here.
I argue that rationality demands higher-order certainty: that is, you should always be certain about what you should believe.
Paper on higher-order evidence and the normativity of logic
I argue that ideal rationality doesn't require logical omniscience, for reasons having to do with the normative significance of
higher-order evidence.
The Humility Heuristic or: People Worth Trusting Admit to What They Don't Know
I offer a vindication of the idea that people who express epistemic humility are more trustworthy for that reason.
*There are a number of typesetting errors in the published version of "Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence." They are corrected in the version linked here.
