Publications
Edited book
Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays (co-edited with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Oxford University Press, 2019.
Oxford University Press, 2019.
Journal articles
Good Guesses as Accuracy-Specificity Tradeoffs
Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.
Wise Groups and Humble Persons: The Best of Both Worlds?
Asian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality
Mind, forthcoming.
Can Arbitrary Beliefs Be Rational?
Episteme, forthcoming.
The Humility Heuristic or: People Worth Trusting Admit to What They Don't Know
Social Epistemology, 35, pp. 323-36, 2021.
Does Rationality Demand Higher-Order Certainty?
Synthese, 198, pp. 11561-85, 2021.
Belief Gambles in Epistemic Decision Theory
Philosophical Studies, 178, pp. 497-26, 2021.
Bayesianism for non-ideal agents (with Jens Christian Bjerring)
Erkenntnis, 2020. Online first.
Hyperintensional Semantics: A Fregean Approach (with Jens Christian Bjerring)
Synthese, 197, pp. 3535-58, 2020.
An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Mind, 129, pp. 1071-94, 2019.
Explaining the Illusion of Asymmetric Insight (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10, pp. 769-86, 2019.
Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat
Erkenntnis, 84, pp. 1369-86, 2019.
Group Disagreement: A Belief Aggregation Perspective (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Synthese, 196, pp. 4033-58, 2019.
A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience (with Jens Christian Bjerring)
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48, pp. 501-22, 2019.
Higher-Order Defeat Without Epistemic Dilemmas
Logos & Episteme, 9, pp. 451-65, 2018.
A Higher-Order Approach to Disagreement (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Jens Christian Bjerring)
Episteme, 15, pp. 80-100, 2018.
Counterpossibles and the Nature of Impossible Worlds
SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy, 17, pp. 145-58, 2016.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience
Logic and Logical Philosophy, 24, pp. 377-99, 2015.
Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.
Wise Groups and Humble Persons: The Best of Both Worlds?
Asian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality
Mind, forthcoming.
Can Arbitrary Beliefs Be Rational?
Episteme, forthcoming.
The Humility Heuristic or: People Worth Trusting Admit to What They Don't Know
Social Epistemology, 35, pp. 323-36, 2021.
Does Rationality Demand Higher-Order Certainty?
Synthese, 198, pp. 11561-85, 2021.
Belief Gambles in Epistemic Decision Theory
Philosophical Studies, 178, pp. 497-26, 2021.
Bayesianism for non-ideal agents (with Jens Christian Bjerring)
Erkenntnis, 2020. Online first.
Hyperintensional Semantics: A Fregean Approach (with Jens Christian Bjerring)
Synthese, 197, pp. 3535-58, 2020.
An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief (w/ Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Mind, 129, pp. 1071-94, 2019.
Explaining the Illusion of Asymmetric Insight (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10, pp. 769-86, 2019.
Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat
Erkenntnis, 84, pp. 1369-86, 2019.
Group Disagreement: A Belief Aggregation Perspective (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
Synthese, 196, pp. 4033-58, 2019.
A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience (with Jens Christian Bjerring)
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48, pp. 501-22, 2019.
Higher-Order Defeat Without Epistemic Dilemmas
Logos & Episteme, 9, pp. 451-65, 2018.
A Higher-Order Approach to Disagreement (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Jens Christian Bjerring)
Episteme, 15, pp. 80-100, 2018.
Counterpossibles and the Nature of Impossible Worlds
SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy, 17, pp. 145-58, 2016.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience
Logic and Logical Philosophy, 24, pp. 377-99, 2015.
Book chapters
Higher-Order Evidence and the Normativity of Logic
Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles, S. Stapleford, K. McCain, and M. Steup (eds.). Routledge, 2021.
When Conciliation Frustrates the Epistemic Priorities of Groups (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
The Epistemology of Group Disagreement, F. Broncano-Berrocal and J. Adam Carter (eds.). Routledge, 2020.
Instrumental Reasons for Belief: Elliptical Talk and Elusive Properties (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity, G. Ernst the and S. Schmidt (eds.). Routledge, 2020.
Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence*
Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles, S. Stapleford, K. McCain, and M. Steup (eds.). Routledge, 2021.
When Conciliation Frustrates the Epistemic Priorities of Groups (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
The Epistemology of Group Disagreement, F. Broncano-Berrocal and J. Adam Carter (eds.). Routledge, 2020.
Instrumental Reasons for Belief: Elliptical Talk and Elusive Properties (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen)
The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity, G. Ernst the and S. Schmidt (eds.). Routledge, 2020.
Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence*
Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
*There are some typesetting errors in the published version of "Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence." They are corrected in the version linked here.
